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Edward Christie
Potential Trade in Southeast Europe: A Gravity Model Approach
Introduction
Gravity models have been used extensively in recent years to try to quantify potential trade
levels, particularly with transition countries. This paper presents a classical approach to the
problem, and focuses the discussion on the variables of the model, with a specific
emphasis on trade flows with and within southeast Europe.
The overall performance of the model presented in this paper seems good when viewed
superficially, notably from the viewpoint of classical goodness-of-fit measurement. On
closer inspection, many trade flows are substantially larger or substantially smaller than the
model would forecast, especially flows with and within southeast Europe.
These large deviations nevertheless constitute interesting information regarding trade
levels for the region, and a certain number of comments of interest can be inferred from the
model's estimations. Perhaps the most important conclusion is that the classical question :
'Have they reached potential already, or is there still some way to go ?' receives a very
differentiated answer depending on which trade flow one considers.
The Gravity Model
The gravity model for trade is analogous to Newton's gravity law in mechanics: the
gravitational pull between two physical bodies (in newtons) is proportional to the product of
each body's mass (in kilograms) divided by the square of the distance between their





G F = (f1.1)
The analogy for trade is as follows : the trade flow between two countries is proportional to
the product of each country's 'economic mass', generally measured by GDP, each to the
power of quantities to be determined, divided by the distance between the countries’
respective 'economic centres of gravity', generally their capitals, raised to the power of
another quantity to be determined. Such a model, which will be referred to from now on as
the baseline gravity model, offers room for estimation, as the exponents for the two
masses and for distance are not set.
d g b D Y kY M X M = (f1.2)2
where M is the flow of imports into country M from country X, Y M and Y X are country M’s
and country X’s GDPs, and D is the geographical distance between the countries’ capitals.
The linear form of the model is as follows:
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This baseline model, when estimated, gives relatively good results. However, we know that
there are other factors that influence trade levels. On the other hand, since this model
seems to provide a reasonably neutral base as to what levels of trade should be, why not
test for specific groups of countries between which trade is believed to be unusually high or
unusually low? One could try to determine, for example, if a given trade agreement really
does give rise to 'higher than normal' trade.
To address both of these questions, most estimates of gravity models add to (f1.3) a
certain number of dummy variables that test for specific effects, for example being a
member of a trade agreement such as NAFTA or the EU, sharing a common land border,
speaking the same language and so on.
Assuming that we wish to test for p distinct effects, the model then becomes:
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Estimation and Specification Issues
One important thing to do when using specifications that include a large number of dummy
variables is to avoid cases of near- or perfect multicollinearity. This is avoided by making
sure that there is no excessive combined or single overlap between the categories defined
by the dummy variables.
Furthermore, the magnitude and the significance of a dummy variable changes depending
on which other dummy variables are already in the model, even when the dummy
variables are completely independent from each other. With dummy variables for
categories that never overlap, the significance and magnitude of the estimate of the3
coefficient of a particular dummy variable changes depending on which other dummy
variables are already there. What happens is that as categories of higher than average
flows are dummied out, the coefficients on GDP and distance become smaller, causing the
model’s base to be lower. This in turn means that the necessary upward correction from
the base for an even completely independent category of flows becomes larger.
For example the magnitude of the dummy for the EU will change substantially depending
on whether it is simply added onto the baseline model or whether it is added when dummy
variables for CEFTA, the CIS and other categories are already there.
This implies that the interpretation of the magnitude of the coefficients of the dummy
variables must always be made bearing in mind that the other dummy variables are in the
model, and that this has had an effect on the magnitudes of the coefficients of the baseline
model.
Another way of looking at it is to say that the corrective factor accounts not only for
categories which the flow belongs to, but also for the categories the flow doesn’t belong to.
For example, the estimate of a dummy for trade flows between FR Yugoslavia and a group
comprising Germany, Italy and Austria is significant when introduced into the baseline
model, giving the impression that there is still some unfulfilled potential. But after adding
the other dummy variables, the former dummy variable is no longer significant: the flows
are neither EU nor OECD nor EU Association Agreement flows and therefore the flows
between these three EU member states and FR Yugoslavia are lower than with most other
countries, GDP and distance accounted for.
Breuss and Egger (1999) argue that cross-section estimations of trade potential are not
very reliable. They find very large confidence intervals around estimates, making
comments as to whether current flows are below or above potential often statistically
meaningless. Indeed, there is a high degree of country-pair heterogeneity in trade flows,
and southeast European flows are a good example of that. The main problem with cross-
section analysis is that one has in the sample many trade flows that are either abnormally
high or abnormally low, which increases the standard error and yields large confidence
intervals. Comparing flows to central estimate values, which correspond to 'average
behaviour', is worth doing when, as is the case here, one focuses on specific flows and
when one takes into account specific local factors. In this way, one can account for the
heterogeneity of country-to-country trade flow levels.4
Data, Variables and Units
Questions on how to measure the concepts of economic mass and economic distance
arise as soon as one makes the analogy from Newton's gravity law to the corresponding
gravity model for trade.
It is debatable what can best represent the concept of 'economic mass'. Gross Domestic
Product seems an obvious guess, but then, should one measure it nominally and at current
exchange rates, or at constant prices, or perhaps at Power Purchasing Parities?
Distance is also a problem. Geographical distance between capitals, although broadly a
reasonable idea, does not take sufficient account of a whole series of trade impediments
that surely matter, such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, or actual real transport costs.
Goods are transported by sea, by road, by rail or over inland waterways.
Other practical questions include waiting times at borders and transport infrastructure
quality. Also, measuring between capitals may not always be a good idea: Austria and
Slovakia, whose capitals are very close, is a case in point.
Regarding economic mass, I have settled for nominal GDP in US dollars at exchange rates
for the main model, but I also estimate a model with GDP at PPP. The main assumption is
that trade usually happens at international prices, and therefore GDP at PPP has no
bearing on trade levels. On the other hand, given the strong under valuation of certain
countries’ GDPs, most notably Russia for 1999, and given the fact that specific country
pairs may be conducting substantial shares of their trade at different, 'local' prices, say,
within the CIS, it is tempting to estimate the model with GDPs at PPP and see how the
corresponding dummy variable coefficients change.
The data used for this paper was initially borrowed from Jarko and Jan Fidrmuc (4) and
was enhanced to include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia, as well as all
observations for 1999. Subsequently, OECD data was taken for GDPs, all in billions of US
dollars at current prices, instead of the initial IMF-IFS figures. Missing GDP figures were
filled in with WIIW data where available. The GDPs at PPP were also from the WIIW.
For trade flows, measured as c.i.f. imports in millions of US dollars at current prices, the
main source was the IMF-DOT database. Missing values were filled in using WIIW data,
where available. The distance matrix was provided by Jarko Fidrmuc. The distances were
taken as the geographical distance between capital cities in kilometres, the only exception
being for Germany, where the capital was replaced by the centre of a triangle linking
Frankfurt, Munich and Berlin.5
The main model in this paper uses geographical distance between capitals, but in a
separate estimation, attempts are made to take better account of transport costs by using
data from the ÖIR, the Austrian Institute for Spatial Planning. The data from the ÖIR is a
transport time matrix between the main transport nodes of Central and Eastern Europe.
Total transport times (including waiting times at borders) are given for each bilateral
connection between nodes (separately for each direction) and each node can be viewed
as the centre of a region that accounts for a certain proportion of national GDP. It is thus
possible to compute an aggregate average transport time between two countries. This
aggregate transport time is then used in a gravity model instead of geographical distance.
The main hope behind this procedure is to take better account of 'real-life' problems such
as infrastructure quality and transport impediments such as border waiting times. I come
back to this in more detail in a separate section.
Apart from these various attempts at using alternatives for mass and distance, the main
thrust of the models in this paper was to use a set of dummy variables to isolate country
groups of interest. For non-southeast European trade flows, categories that were taken into
consideration, were the EU, the non-EU OECD (old membership, i.e. without Turkey and
without the new central European members), CEFTA, the CIS (restricted to Russia,
Belarus and Ukraine), the Europe Agreements (between the EU and certain transition
countries), the Baltic States, flows between the Baltic States and the CIS, flows between
Bulgaria and the CIS and flows between the Visegrad-4 and the CIS. A further dummy
variable was added for English-speaking countries, which overlaps with OECD
membership.
For southeast Europe, various overall regional and sub-regional effects were tested in
order to answer various questions of interest. One important question was to try to see
whether, with regards to trade flows, southeast Europe qualifies as a region, and/or
whether selected sub-groups of countries may qualify as regions. Another question of
interest was to take a closer look at flows between the region and the EU.
For these purposes, it is necessary to define what is meant by southeast Europe. In this
paper, southeast Europe is defined as the following group of 7 countries: Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and FR Yugoslavia. This group is
referred to as SEE-7. In a wider view of the region, it is interesting to include Slovenia and
Hungary in the northwest, and Greece and Turkey in the southeast. This latter group is
referred to as SEE-11.
The categories defined for dummy variables for this paper included the SEE-7 and the
SEE-11 (to see if there is any specific overall regional effect) as well as several different
sub-groups. The idea is that since, as will be shown later, trade flows are rather 'irregular'
in the region due to political circumstances, certain groups of countries may have diverted6
trade from certain traditional regional partners to other traditional partners. For instance,
trade between Croatia and FR Yugoslavia is extremely low, whereas trade between
Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia is very high. On the eastern side of Yugoslavia,
there has been much talk of  'eastern Slav' solidarity with Yugoslavia from Macedonia and
Bulgaria. Macedonia, on the other hand, has trade agreements with Croatia and Slovenia,
a category also tested in the model.
Three categories are defined: North-West Balkans, widened to include Bosnia, Croatia,
Slovenia and Hungary and East Balkans, the 'eastern Slav effect', including Yugoslavia,
Macedonia and Bulgaria. The third category covers the trade agreement linking Macedonia
with Slovenia and Croatia. There is a partial overlap between the North-West Balkans
variable and the Macedonia-Slovenia-Croatia agreement, as they both include trade
between Slovenia and Croatia.
Estimation Results
The table below displays the results of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation on
pooled cross-section data from 1996 to 1999. This is similar to applying Fixed Effects on
the equivalent panel, although only time effects are selected here, not individual effects, i.e.
one-way-country-pair specific effects, which would miss the point of the gravity model
entirely. (Having a specific dummy for trade from Croatia to Hungary, another one for trade
from Hungary to Croatia and so on, for each trade relationship, would make the gravity
model itself rather pointless.)
The column furthest to the right is the calculated multiplicative effect of the respective
dummy variable coefficient estimation. The total number of observations was 5211. The
estimations were made with E-Views 3.1.
Dependant Variable: Aggregate imports c.i.f.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Dum. Effect
OVERALL INTERCEPT 4.692106 0.135365 34.6626 0.0000 *****
YEAR97 0.102904 0.038737 2.656459 0.0079 1.11
YEAR98 0.125137 0.038737 3.23042 0.0012 1.13
YEAR99 0.138858 0.038737 3.58467 0.0003 1.15
LOG(GDP of Importer) 0.869624 0.008951 97.15489 0.0000 *****
LOG(GDP of Exporter) 1.012203 0.008983 112.6841 0.0000 *****
LOG(DISTANCE) -1.208167 0.019285 -62.64648 0.0000 *****
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 0.859058 0.169248 5.075727 0.0000 2.36
Non-EU OECD 1.206146 0.119414 10.10057 0.0000 3.34
Non-EU OECD with EU 0.752947 0.055314 13.61224 0.0000 2.12
EU14 0.796057 0.050058 15.90262 0.0000 2.22
EU Association Agreements 0.641404 0.038526 16.64856 0.0000 1.90
CEFTA7 1.027585 0.08267 12.43 0.0000 2.797
CIS 3.15302 0.203911 15.4627 0.0000 23.41
BALTIC States 3.756004 0.205896 18.24224 0.0000 42.78
BALTIC States – CIS 2.520586 0.119902 21.02204 0.0000 12.44
Bulgaria – CIS 2.325087 0.203316 11.43582 0.0000 10.23
Visegrad-4 – CIS 1.713819 0.103316 16.58819 0.0000 5.55
Austria – Slovakia -1.740547 0.355801 -4.891906 0.0000 0.18
Czech Republic – Slovakia 2.293305 0.358588 6.395373 0.0000 9.91
North-West Balkans 1.063333 0.157447 6.753582 0.0000 2.90
East Balkans 2.355599 0.225348 10.45317 0.0000 10.54
Bulgaria – EU3 0.48001 0.204351 2.348951 0.0189 1.62
Romania – EU3 0.747425 0.223715 3.340968 0.0008 2.11
Slovenia-Croatia-Macedonia 2.44454 0.210115 11.63431 0.0000 11.53
Yug. Imports from Bosnia 3.135012 0.496684 6.311885 0.0000 22.99
Yug. Imports from Russia 1.8264 0.494864 3.69071 0.0002 6.21
R-squared 0.855507 Mean dependent var 5.068252
Adjusted R-squared 0.854782 S.D. dependent var 2.594083
S.E. of regression 0.988539 Akaike info criterion 2.81999
Sum squared resid 5065.852 Schwarz criterion 2.853972
Log likelihood -7320.485 F-statistic 1180.506
Durbin-Watson stat 1.637761 Prob(F-statistic) 0
The data used for this estimation is sorted so that the set of observations for 1996
occupies the first 1303 observations, followed by the same numbers of observations for
1997 and so on.
The results display the following effects:
There is a slight but steady rise of the intercept through time, which indicates a slight
increasing trend in overall trade throughout the sample. The interpretation is the following:
all other parameters being equal, the increase in the overall coefficient is 11% from 1996 to
1997, 13% from 1996 to 1998 and 15% from 1996 to 1999. Given the chosen years, this
could simply be due to the business cycle.
The baseline variables (both GDPs and distance) are very highly significant, have the
expected signs and are of reasonable magnitude compared to other gravity model
estimations. One point of interest: the coefficient estimates for the two GDPs are
significantly different from each other, a result not found in all estimations. There is no
theoretical justification for this. In fact, it is due to the sample, since the sample contains
many small economies (most transition economies) that, in most cases, have trade deficits
with the larger economies (most EU countries).
The dummies for western countries indicate significant effects for the EU and for the
OECD, as well as for trade between English-speaking countries. OECD membership (all
members except Turkey and the recent central European entrants) is split in three
categories: trade flows between EU member states, trade flows between non-members of
the EU, and trade flows between non-members and members.8
The effect of the English language is quite strong as it is a subset of OECD membership
and is nevertheless significant. One should note that other languages, such as German or
French don’t display such effects.
For central Europe, we find CEFTA membership to be significant, as well as the EU
Association Agreements. Also, there is still very high trade between the Czech and Slovak
republics whereas trade between Austria and Slovakia is rather low and needs a correction
for the very short distance between the countries' capitals.
The CIS (here Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) seems a huge effect, as well as trade
between the Baltic States and the CIS, and trade amongst the Baltic States. Before
rushing to any conclusion, one should bear in mind that the GDPs of some of these
countries are grossly undervalued, the most striking example being Russia in 1999, in the
aftermath of the 'Russian Crisis' of 1998. Also, countries such as Russia and Ukraine have
very large informal sectors, the size of which one can only guess at. Finally, as discussed
in the previous section, some of the trade within the CIS takes place at non-international
prices. The CIS dummy coefficient should therefore be seen as accounting for a
combination of factors, not just excessive trading when economic distances and masses
are accounted for. To a lesser extent, the same critique can be made regarding certain
other dummy variable coefficient estimations, since there is no adjacency dummy variable
in the model. (In effect, one must choose between regional groupings and adjacency.)
The main points of interest, however, lie with the various effects tested for trade with and
within southeast Europe.
First of all, overall regional variables covering all seven countries or all eleven countries
(according to the wider definition of the region) are both non significant for the year 1999.
Overall, they appear as significant in the panel model, but on separate cross-section
regressions their significance deteriorates with the years. In other words, from the point of
view of trade, southeast Europe cannot be considered as a region, at least not any more.
This particular point is shown in the annex, where I give the parameter estimate’s value for
cross-section regressions.
Nevertheless, there are ways of dividing southeast Europe into sub-regions which prove to
be successful. The main split is between Croatia and FR Yugoslavia, with Bosnia-
Herzegovina belonging to both sub-regions. Unfortunately, separate trade data for the
Federation and for Republika Srpska was not available, but it is clear that Republika
Srpska is mainly directed towards FR Yugoslavia. Thus, the dummy for imports into FR
Yugoslavia from Bosnia is significant and high in magnitude. The North-West Balkans and
the East Balkans dummy are both significant.9
This split in the middle of the former Yugoslavia affects mainly links between Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia, however, as Macedonia has trade agreements
with Slovenia and Croatia. The corresponding dummy is both significant and high in
magnitude.
Regarding trade flows between countries of the region and countries of the EU, I decided
to focus on the three 'frontline' EU partners, i.e. Germany, Italy and Austria.
I tested seven different dummy variables, each for trade flows between the latter three EU
member states and each country of the region. The only significant dummy variables are
for trade with Romania and Bulgaria. Both have association agreements with the EU,
whereas the other countries of the region don’t. But the EU association agreements
(Europe Agreements) dummy variable is also in the model, which means that the distortion
in favour of trade with Germany, Italy and Austria is quite high.
For the other countries of the region this result implies that there is no significant negative
distortion of their trade with the three EU member states.
One further comment should be made: contrary to many other gravity models, the models
in this paper do not include the adjacency dummy variable (common land border). This is
not to say that such effects do not take place. What happens is that the various sub-
regional groupings defined in this paper capture various effects simultaneously, and
adjacency is one of them. In the end, the presence in the model of all the regional
groupings where adjacency actually has an effect render the adjacency variable itself non-
significant. Indeed, there are many counter-examples to the adjacency effect even in
Western Europe. France and Belgium or Italy and Switzerland are typical examples. As for
southeast Europe, positive adjacency effects, say, between Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina or between FR Yugoslavia and Macedonia, are captured by the respective
sub-regional dummy variables.
Trade flows between countries of southeast Europe and Germany, Italy or Austria are at
relatively unsurprising levels, whereas trade flows between countries of the region are
mostly very far from what the baseline model would predict. Some flows are well below
potential whereas others are far higher than potential. Southeast Europe is not a region in
itself, but it contains at least two sub-regions. There is a major fault line that runs right
through Bosnia-Herzegovina, putting Croatia in one sub-region and FR Yugoslavia in the
other. This divide doesn’t affect all countries, however, as Macedonia in particular has
trade agreements of significant importance with Slovenia and Croatia.10
Bulgaria and Romania have significant trade agreements with the EU which the other
countries of the core region don’t have. Simultaneously, Bulgaria still displays some strong
links to the CIS.
Future Prospects for Trade Flows with and within Southeast Europe
Two elements characterise the present situation of many transition economies: below
potential GDP and incomplete integration in international structures. This is especially the
case for the core countries of southeast Europe.
With the notable exceptions of Romania and Bulgaria, none of the remaining five core
countries have yet been short-listed for negotiations to join the EU. They all have much
further scope for economic growth, and they all have very high levels of unemployment.
These remaining five countries, Croatia being a favourite for first place, will almost certainly
be invited to sign up for association agreements with the EU for a transitory period. (as
have Romania and Bulgaria) In the mean time, compatible with western wishes and
building on the trade agreements linking Macedonia to Croatia and Slovenia, there is the
possibility that the region could create a free-trade agreement of its own.
Finally, in the long run, it is likely that the whole region will join the EU and the Euro. (The
Euro is already important in the region in practice through DM-isation.)
GDP levels in the region are below their long-term potential, but how and how fast a catch-
up might happen is a complex question, and one major methodological problem is the
interaction between trade and growth. The gravity model is a single equation model that
considers GDP to be exogenous, so there is no scope for export-led growth.
In spite of this limitation, one can have an 'educated guess' at potential GDPs for the
countries of the region and feed them back into the model to have an estimation of
potential trade. One should bear in mind, however, that this is by no means a forecast, as it
uses the estimated parameters from 1999. By the time the countries reach the levels of
GDP considered, there may have been one or several regime changes.
One possibility for estimating potential is to calculate the extra GDP generated by a partial
absorption of unemployment under the assumption of constant average labour productivity.
There are two different aspects to look at: the first is the actual unemployment rates,
whether officially registered or otherwise measured, say, using ILO methodology. The
other aspect is that of the participation ratio. This is important especially for the countries of
former Yugoslavia. Bosnia is an extreme case, having been hit especially hard by years of11
war, it has a large number of persons of working age that are either dead, wounded or
refugees in other countries. Similar circumstances explain similar, although less severe,
situations in Croatia and FR Yugoslavia.
The idea is to estimate a potential GDP according to what GDP would be if both the
population structures and the unemployment rates were 'normal', i.e. similar to what they
are in central Europe. For this purpose, and to avoid speculation as to how the change
would be distributed between population structure and unemployment rate, I just calculate
the extra output generated if the total employment to total population ratio were for all
seven countries the same as the average for the Visegrad countries.
In the following tables I give the current employment-to-population ratios for the four
Visegrad countries and for all seven countries. I then provide the estimates for potential
GDP. Population figures are in millions, GDP data are in millions of USD at current 1999
prices, GDP per worker data are in USD.
The 'Extra empl' line refers to the number of additional employed persons necessary for
the Employment/Population ratio to reach the Visegrad-4 average of 41.38%. The
additional GDP is calculated by multiplying the number of extra employees by the current
GDP/worker.
The term ILO refers to ILO methodology. This is done by conducting surveys where people
are asked if they are looking for work, rather than counting the number of unemployment
benefit claimants.
Visegrad-4
CZ HU SK PL TOTAL
Population 10.2826 10.044 5.3951 38.6536 64.3753
ILO Unempl 8.80% 7.00% 19.20% 13.00% 12.01%
ILO Un.Tot. 0.457 0.295 0.535 2.350 3.637
Work Force 5.1915 4.21875 2.7865 18.0769 30.2737
WF/Pop 50.49% 42.00% 51.65% 46.77% 47.03%
Empl/Pop 46.05% 39.06% 41.73% 40.69% 41.38%
Southeast Europe
BG (ILO) HR (ILO) MK (ILO) RO (ILO) YU (reg.) AL (reg.) BA (reg.)
Population 8.2106 4.554 2.0178 22.458 8.3722 3.373 3.75
Unempl rate 15.70% 13.60% 32.40% 6.90% 25.50% 18.40% 38.50%
Unempl tot 0.600 0.244 0.262 0.678 0.774 0.240 0.409
Work Force 3.8188 1.7906 0.8071 9.826 3.035 1.304 1.063
WF/Pop 46.51% 39.32% 40.00% 43.75% 36.25% 38.66% 28.35%
Empl/Pop 39.21% 33.97% 27.04% 40.73% 27.01% 31.55% 17.43%
Employed 3.219 1.547 0.546 9.148 2.261 1.064 0.654
GDP 12368 20425 3428 34024 16450 3788 441812
GDP/worker 3841.9 13202.3 6283.0 3719.3 7275.3 3559.9 6758.0
Extra empl 0.178 0.337 0.289 0.144 1.203 0.332 0.898
New GDP 13052 24877 5246 34561 25203 4968 10486
GDP incr% 5.5% 21.8% 53.0% 1.6% 53.2% 31.2% 137.3%
The data in these tables are from WIIW, themselves from national statistics sources. They
are end-of-year values. Some employment totals may differ from direct national sources.
This is because WIIW corrects certain values to include additional sections of the
workforce that are not necessarily in the nationally published statistics. This is for example
the case for FR Yugoslavia, where WIIW adds employment in SMEs to the figure quoted
by the Yugoslav national statistics office.
Unsurprisingly, the biggest winners from this scenario are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia
and FR Yugoslavia. Albania and Croatia also gain a significant amount, whereas Romania
and Bulgaria are only slightly affected, given their more classical employment and higher
participation rates.
In the subsequent tables, selections of flows within the region and between the countries of
the region and selected partners are given at 1999 levels, at 1999 cross-section gravity
model potential levels, and at potential levels using potential GDPs, firstly without any
assumption as to further integration, and then assuming, respectively, EU Association
Agreements, a regional free-trade agreement estimated by the CEFTA dummy effect, and
finally full EU membership for all. All flows are quoted in millions of USD, and all are
measured from the importer’s viewpoint, as imports c.i.f.
The full table with all available flows with and within the region is available in the annex.
The methodology used is to re-estimate the model for 1999 without any of the dummy
variables that affect southeast Europe to get a 'fair estimate' of what should be happening.
This estimate is referred to in the tables as the Base Estimate. Then, one substitutes GDPs
with their potential values and sets chosen dummies such as the EU dummy at 1.
The reason for this methodology is that the dummies specific to southeast Europe can be
considered to correct for situations that are 'abnormal'. Not correcting for these specific
abnormalities enables us to compare potential flows with current flows.
Before we go on, two comments are in order. First of all, the methodology used means that
the Base Estimate is rather low. This is because it is based on a model where there are
dummies almost exclusively for positive distortions: OECD, EU Association Agreements,
CEFTA, CIS, Baltic and Balt-CIS flows. With the exception of flows between Romania or
Bulgaria and the EU, the flows below are computed from the model’s baseline, as none of
the dummies mentioned above apply to them. One consequence of this is that trade13
between Croatia and FR Yugoslavia, for example, appears to be at Base Estimate
potential, when in fact it is quite low. This is why there are the other columns to show more
probable potentials, such as may exist if there were a free-trade agreement, higher GDP
and so on.
Secondly, regarding the interpretation of the potentials in general, one should bear in mind
that these are based on 1999 data and on a model estimated with that year’s data. They
should therefore not be viewed as forecasts. If one wishes to adapt the potentials to future
years, one should bear in mind firstly that the GDP levels of all the countries will change,
including EU or CIS countries, and secondly, that the parameters of the model may change
as well.
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BA), FR Yugoslavia (YU), Croatia (HR)










BA HR 595.122 14.289 37.218 73.560 103.342
BA YU NA 19.546 63.231 124.973 175.572
HR BA 115.9 11.690 33.202 65.622 92.191
HR YU 24.070 23.288 42.734 84.462 118.658
YU BA 187.785 16.428 56.311 111.296 156.357
YU HR 18.870 23.925 42.661 84.317 118.454
Yugoslav exports to Bosnia-Herzegovina were 304.1 million USD f.o.b.
Judging by these potential values, there is scope for much more trade between Croatia
and Yugoslavia in the medium- to long-term. The level of Bosnian imports from Croatia is
very high compared to potential values and should be expected to fall. Croatian imports
from Yugoslavia are not surprising from the Base Estimate point of view, but that is a low
base. There is a large potential to fulfil from GDP growth and better regional integration.
It should be said that the model doesn’t take proper account of the very specific geographic
configuration of the region: Bosnia is 'locked' by Croatia and FR Yugoslavia and it is not
entirely surprising that there is some over-trade compared to a gravity model.
Furthermore, there is what one could call 'ethnic trading' between Croatia and the
Federation on the one hand, and between Republika Srpska and FR Yugoslavia on the
other hand.
FR Yugoslavia (YU), Macedonia (MK), Bulgaria (BG)










BG MK 24.61 14.431 23.033 45.523 63.954
BG YU 176.946 19.394 31.028 61.325 86.15414
MK BG 91.32 17.102 25.982 51.351 72.142
MK YU 181.883 6.607 14.603 28.862 40.547
YU BG 151.595 18.684 28.443 56.217 78.977
YU MK 122.425 5.371 11.867 23.455 32.951
FR Yugoslavia trades very far above potential with Macedonia and Bulgaria, about double
or more the largest potential which is computed with the potential GDPs and with the
CEFTA dummy. Both countries are important for both imports and exports.
International trade sanctions, together with NATO’s military intervention, have forced FR
Yugoslavia into above potential trade with selected neighbours and Russia, and rather low
trade with everyone else. In effect, FR Yugoslavia’s foreign trade displays a very irregular
pattern, with massive redirecting of trade to specific 'friendly partners'.
So although Macedonia, Bulgaria and Republika Srpska can be expected to retain strong
ties to FR Yugoslavia, it is clear that there is scope for a large-scale redirecting of FR
Yugoslavia’s trade.
In the region, Croatia is the first obvious choice. After all, these are neighbouring countries
that share a virtually identical language.
Outside of the region, as will be shown in a subsequent table, there are also large
potentials for trade with EU countries.
Russia (RU) and FR Yugoslavia (YU)
Importer Exporter Current Flow (1999) Base Estimate Estimate with potential GDPs With the CEFTA Dummy
RU YU NA 26.355 40.342 112.015
YU RU 274.294 36.278 52.488 145.740
The CEFTA dummy column in this case doesn’t imply a scenario for a free-trade
agreement between Russia and Yugoslavia. It is there as a benchmark.
Russian imports c.i.f. from FR Yugoslavia were unavailable for 1999. However, Yugoslav
exports to Russia f.o.b. (as reported by Yugoslav sources) was 77.7 million USD in 1999
and had a peak of 183.1 million USD in 1997.
If those figures are not too far from the actual c.i.f. values on the Russian side, one can
interpret them as being much higher than potential. Care should be taken with the figure for
1997, as that was a time when both GDPs were much higher: before the Russian crisis
and before the NATO bombings.15
In the other direction the flow of Russian goods into FR Yugoslavia were substantially
larger even than the potential flow with the CEFTA dummy. Although there is scope for
more potential if and when both Russia and FR Yugoslavia join the WTO, it is unrealistic to
assume an agreement as strong as CEFTA between the two countries. On the contrary,
reasonable future prospects point to FR Yugoslavia having more trade with the EU.
However the figures include oil and gas, so one should be cautious in interpreting
potentials in the Russia-to-FRY direction. Russian exports are significantly above potential
with most partners precisely because of this.
Bulgaria (BG), Russia (RU), Ukraine (UA)
Importer Exporter Current Flow (1999) Base Estimate Estimate with potential GDPs With the CEFTA Dummy
BG RU 1124.26 28.309 29.588 82.155
BG UA 130.20 11.149 11.652 32.354
RU BG 109.00 19.812 20.847 57.884
UA BG 67.46 9.887 10.403 28.886
Trade links between Bulgaria and Russia and Ukraine are much higher than potential
levels in both directions, although, again, Russian exports are specifically high. It seems
old trade links die hard. However, one should bear in mind that Bulgaria imports almost as
much from Germany as it does from Russia.
Bulgaria with EU3 – Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Austria (AT)
Importer Exporter Current
Flow (1999)




GDPs and the EA
dummy
Estimate with Potential
GDPs and EU dummy
AT BG 88.17 78.400 82.495 91.800
BG AT 162.17 113.820 118.961 132.378
BG DE 812.84 613.795 641.514 713.869
BG IT 459.05 377.166 394.200 438.660
DE BG 524.73 311.256 327.514 364.454
IT BG 565.09 206.768 217.568 242.107
In the table above, the EU Association Agreement dummy is included in the Base
Estimate.
Bulgaria has an association agreement with the EU and is doing its best to join. Flows
between Bulgaria and the three frontline EU members are all close to or above potential.
For the first four flows in the table, the differences are not significant.
Exports to Germany and Italy, especially to Italy, are high, however.16
Romania (RO) with EU3 – Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Austria (AT)
Importer Exporter Current
Flow (1999)




GDPs and EA dummy
Estimate with Potential
GDPs and EU dummy
DE RO 1894.45 766.491 778.544 866.354
RO DE 1778.40 1322.755 1340.794 1492.019
IT RO 2064.46 443.732 450.710 501.544
RO IT 2039.60 708.333 717.993 798.974
RO AT 303.50 240.190 243.466 270.926
AT RO 284.86 189.053 192.026 213.684
Flows between Romania and the EU3 are already above potential.
German imports from Romania are twice the potential level, and Italian imports from
Romania are about 4 times the potential level. It seems Italy has a 'special relationship'
with Romania in both directions. This can continue in the future (there are special
relationships between OECD countries as well) as there is no specific evidence of
Romania ignoring another potentially important partner.
One can expect, at most, these levels to grow along with GDP.
Romania and Bulgaria










BG RO 71.66 32.794 34.811 68.803 96.659
RO BG 54.90 28.698 30.607 60.493 84.986
Both flows are slightly below their potentials, as both countries are already members of
CEFTA. The other potentials are there as benchmarks. As stated earlier, these figures are
imports c.i.f. as reported by the importer country. In the particular case of Bulgaria
importing from Romania, there is a large discrepancy with the export (f.o.b.) figure reported
by Romania which is 136.6 million USD.
This would call for a very different interpretation.
Basing ourselves on the table as it is, however, one sees a potential for slightly more trade
between the two countries. However the potential GDP scenario used in this paper fits the
situation of former Yugoslav republics much more appropriately than it does Romania or
Bulgaria. A scenario based on changes in productivity would yield higher potential GDPs
and therefore higher trade potentials.17
It is also interesting to note that the CEFTA potential is much higher than the EU potential.
One could view future EU membership of both countries as a cause for redirecting of trade,
with less trade between them. This is not certain, however. The EU dummy is the average
effect for the 182 trade flows within the EU14 (Luxemburg isn’t in the sample), and there is
room for substantial country-pair variations. (The UK and France significantly under-trade
with each other, for example.)
Albanian trade with selected regional partners – Bulgaria, Macedonia,
FRY, Turkey (TR)










AL BG 26.545 5.333 7.096 14.026 19.704
BG AL 0.033 4.559 6.246 12.345 17.343
AL MK 17.881 2.694 5.203 10.284 14.448
MK AL 3.1554 2.730 5.166 10.211 14.345
AL YU NA 6.083 11.776 23.274 32.698
YU AL NA 5.010 9.501 18.778 26.381
AL TR 49.161 27.300 34.524 68.234 95.861
TR AL NA 16.332 21.408 42.312 59.443
The point is that the CEFTA effect is much stronger than the EU effect. Since all CEFTA
members will be members of the EU at some stage, and given that all CEFTA members
have Association Agreements with the EU, whose affects on trade are close in magnitude
to actual membership, this means that the scope for trade diversion from intra-CEFTA to
CEFTA-EU could be quite limited.
Unsurprisingly, data for trade between Albania and FR Yugoslavia is unavailable, and
probably nil. With other countries of the region, Albania has very significant trade deficits.
Albania doesn’t have much to export for the moment. On the import side, flows are above
potential, especially with Bulgaria and Macedonia. Imports from Turkey are a bit above
potential.
Albanian trade with selected EU partners – EU3 and Greece (GR)










AL AT 16.21 29.535 37.350 66.338 73.820
AL DE 50.454 166.556 210.630 374.104 416.298
AL IT 341.454 177.349 224.279 398.346 443.275
AT AL 2.391 17.392 22.797 40.490 45.056
DE AL 22.377 72.206 94.645 168.101 187.060
IT AL 168.798 83.118 108.949 193.506 215.331
AL GR 249.32 35.577 44.992 79.911 88.924
GR AL 38.0156 22.416 29.383 52.187 58.07318
Italy and Greece are by far Albania’s most important trade partners. Albania has large
trade deficits with its main EU partners as well, although in relative terms its deficit with
Italy is smaller than with other countries, making Italy by very far Albania’s first export
destination.
Flows with Italy are slightly above present potential but can be expected to increase with
future developments. Flows with Austria and Germany are significantly lower than potential
and should increase in the future.
Imports from Greece are larger than potential. This can be viewed as evidence of
redirecting of trade since trade with FR Yugoslavia is non-existent and not so high with
other regional partners. Exports to Greece are at a normal level, slightly above present
potential.
Albania’s trade is selectively focused on certain countries, mainly non-Balkan southern
countries, firstly Italy, then Greece, and then Turkey. Albania isn’t integrated in southeast
Europe and is especially cut off from Yugoslavia. For the moment, Albania looks south.
Macedonian trade with Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia (SI)










BA MK 21.307 1.691 5.456 10.784 15.150
MK BA 8.8173 1.748 5.979 11.818 16.602
HR MK 52.40 3.390 6.206 12.267 17.233
MK HR 61.79 4.285 7.624 15.069 21.169
SI MK 36.63 2.258 3.449 6.816 9.576
MK SI 156.67 2.851 4.116 8.136 11.430
Macedonia trades above potential with most countries of the region. Macedonia has a
trade agreement with Slovenia and Croatia which works very well. Trade with both these
countries is much higher even than potential with the CEFTA dummy. Trade with Bosnia is
also surprisingly high, although especially for Macedonian exports to Bosnia.
Macedonia with EU3










AT MK 6.80 15.762 24.070 42.750 47.572
DE MK 260.14 62.759 95.838 170.219 189.418
IT MK 168.87 63.422 96.851 172.019 191.421
MK AT 44.52 27.118 39.153 69.540 77.383
MK DE 245.27 146.664 211.755 376.102 418.522
MK IT 92.69 137.100 197.946 351.575 391.22819
The most noticeable flow is German imports from Macedonia, which is much higher than
potential, even than the potential with the EU membership dummy. Surprisingly, Austrian
imports from Macedonia are, on the contrary, very low, lower even than the Base Estimate.
An adjustment of both of these values should be expected. Italian imports from Macedonia
are already high as well.
In the other direction, Macedonia imports below potential from Italy. Macedonian imports
from Germany and Austria are a bit above present potential levels.
FR Yugoslavia with EU3










AT YU 169.397 151.158 231.382 410.962 457.313
YU AT 113.856 211.409 305.867 543.256 604.528
DE YU 383.938 375.181 574.302 1020.029 1135.075
YU DE 404.831 712.747 1031.205 1831.543 2038.118
IT YU 408.094 421.895 645.808 1147.032 1276.403
YU IT 331.541 741.383 1072.635 1905.128 2120.003
There is significant potential for more trade between FR Yugoslavia and the EU3 countries.
From the point of view of FR Yugoslavia’s exports, present levels are in line with the Base
Estimates. But potentials from the various scenarios point to much higher values.
Italy and Germany should become by very far FR Yugoslavia’s most important partners,









GDPs and EA dummy
Estimate with Potential
GDPs and EU dummy
AT HR 262.48 673.145 829.627 1473.517 1639.712
HR AT 549.19 916.393 1098.584 1951.216 2171.289
DE HR 685.41 790.700 974.510 1730.846 1926.064
HR DE 1439.47 1462.132 1752.823 3113.224 3464.356
IT HR 715.41 1067.696 1315.898 2337.193 2600.798
HR IT 1234.24 1826.277 2189.366 3888.576 4327.158
There is also a high potential for trade between Croatia and the EU3. Current levels as well
as the Trade between Austria and Croatia is far below the Base Estimate, so in relative
terms there should be large gains there. There is also some unfulfilled potential for trade
with Italy in the current situation.20
Although trade with Germany should increase in the future, its relative importance should
decrease in favour of Italy, Croatia’s prime natural trade partner.
A model using GDP at PPP
In this section we look at estimation results when using GDP at PPP instead of at
exchange rates. The point is to see how the dummy variables for certain groups of
countries are affected. This model was estimated on pooled data for 1996 to 1999 for
countries for which GDP at PPP was available. The year effect dummies were taken out as
they were not significant.
GDPs at PPP were not available for all countries, most notably they were not available for
Yugoslavia or for Bosnia, which is why interpretations are more difficult to make, and this
model is therefore not directly comparable to the earlier one with GDP at exchange rates.
Apparently, the core seven countries display a positive distortion of trade, but that’s without
Yugoslavia or Bosnia. The East Balkans dummy only refers to trade between Bulgaria and
Macedonia. The North-West Balkans dummy isn’t significant any more.
Dependant Variable: Aggregate imports c.i.f.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Dum. Effect
OVERALL INTERCEPT 3.573546 0.131368 27.20263 0.0000 *****
LOG(GDP-IMP-PPP) 0.896312 0.009631 93.06576 0.0000 *****
LOG(GDP-EXP-PPP) 1.00027 0.009661 103.5353 0.0000 *****
LOG(DISTANCE) -1.154196 0.018023 -64.04026 0.0000 *****
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 0.583092 0.148519 3.926046 0.0001 1.79
Non-EU OECD 2.140523 0.103693 20.64286 0.0000 8.50
Non-EU OECD with EU 1.612721 0.046544 34.6494 0.0000 5.02
EU14 1.613317 0.041935 38.47169 0.0000 5.02
EU Association Agreements 0.536451 0.035264 15.21245 0.0000 1.71
CEFTA7 0.185628 0.074205 2.50156 0.0124 1.20
Czech Rep.-Slovakia 2.199867 0.314442 6.996095 0.0000 9.02
BALTIC States 2.989007 0.181858 16.43592 0.0000 19.87
BALTIC States – CIS 1.239048 0.127677 9.704526 0.0000 3.45
CIS 1.504648 0.308321 4.880142 0.0000 4.50
Bulgaria – CIS 0.985941 0.217923 4.524261 0.0000 2.68
Visegrad-4 – CIS 0.603044 0.111243 5.420973 0.0000 1.83
Slovenia-Croatia-Macedonia 2.97032 0.186216 15.95097 0.0000 19.50
Variable (followed) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Dum. Effect
East Balkans 1.581406 0.33955 4.657365 0.0000 4.86
Southeast Europe 7 -1.089992 0.144281 -7.554658 0.0000 0.34
R-squared 0.868372 Mean dependent var 5.518495
Adjusted R-squared 0.867832 S.D. dependent var 2.38412321
S.E. of regression 0.866747 Akaike info criterion 2.55617
Sum squared resid 3291.231 Schwarz criterion 2.583761
Log likelihood -5604.575 F-statistic 1605.682
Durbin-Watson stat 1.614571 Prob(F-statistic) 0
More interestingly though, the CIS dummy and the Bulgaria – CIS dummy are still
significant but much lower in magnitude. GDP at PPP corrects for the under valuation of
Russian and Ukrainian GDPs, and corrects for trade happening at non-international prices.
It would have been interesting to have trade and PPP data for Republika Srpska and FR
Yugoslavia, since they probably conduct a substantial part of their trade at local prices.
The dummy for trade between Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia is even higher than with
the original model. This should be put in perspective since the original model also includes
the North-West Balkans dummy which overlaps on trade between Croatia and Slovenia.
A model with transport cost variables
The data on total transport times is as follows: each country has a certain number of
chosen important transport nodes. The matrix contains the transport time from each node
to every other node. Each transport node can be considered as representing a region of
the country it is in, with a corresponding share of the country’s GDP. Therefore, one can
aggregate the transport times by computing a two-way weighted sum of transport times.
For instance, say country A has 2 nodes, A 1 and A 2, and say country B has 2 nodes, B 1
and B 2, and say that the respective GDP shares are a 1, a 2, b 1 and b 2, whereas the
transport times from A to B are respectively T A1,B1 (for goods transported from A 1 to B 1),
TA1,B2, TA2,B1 and TA2,B2. Then the aggregate transport time from A to B will be computed as:
Aggregate Transport Time (A,B) = a1 TA1,B1 b1 + a1 TA1,B2 b2+ a2 TA2,B1 b1+ a2 TA2,B2 b2
One should bear in mind that transport times are not necessarily the same depending on
the direction of the flow, i.e. the aggregate time from A to B may defer from the aggregate
time from B to A, since the individual transport time from a given node X to another given
node Y may be different from the individual transport time from node Y to node X.
The data available covers all the countries of central and Eastern Europe except Moldova
and the Baltic States. Turkey, Germany, Italy and Austria are also included. The complete
list of nodes, together with the shares in national GDP attributed to each node, is given in
the appendix.22
Individual travel times between nodes include a 15% allowance for stops of various kinds
(petrol and so on) and also depend on estimated congestion and road infrastructure
quality, in particular the number of lanes and their condition. Transport times between
nodes are equal to travel time plus border waiting times.
The table below presents two versions of the Baseline model estimated on a 1999 cross-
section, the first one with distance and the second with aggregated transport times.
Dependent Variable : Aggregate imports c.i.f. Distance Used
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
INTERCEPT 6.576763 0.681848 9.645499 0.0000
LOG(GDP of Importer) 0.792092 0.037846 20.92935 0.0000
LOG(GDP of Exporter) 1.013014 0.038458 26.34074 0.0000
LOG(DISTANCE) -1.296578 0.109228 -11.87041 0.0000
R-squared 0.735523 Mean dependent var 4.67653
Adjusted R-squared 0.733269 S.D. dependent var 2.385452
S.E. of regression 1.231992 Akaike info criterion 3.266314
Sum squared resid 534.267 Schwarz criterion 3.309852
Log likelihood -577.4039 F-statistic 326.3088
Durbin-Watson stat 2.097236 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Since the sample, the dependent variable and the number of variables are identical from
one estimation to the next, one can compare the R-squareds directly. The improvement in
goodness-of-fit is tiny. In fact, modifying the sample slightly could turn the result the other
way, so in a way the results are a bit disappointing.
Dependent Variable : Aggregate imports c.i.f. Transport Time Used
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
INTERCEPT 8.215693 0.807441 10.17498 0.0000
LOG(GDP of Importer) 0.642042 0.035922 17.87311 0.0000
LOG(GDP of Exporter) 0.865479 0.036378 23.79102 0.0000
LOG(Transport Time) -1.206307 0.100736 -11.97489 0.0000
R-squared 0.736853 Mean dependent var 4.67653
Adjusted R-squared 0.73461 S.D. dependent var 2.385452
S.E. of regression 1.22889 Akaike info criterion 3.261272
Sum squared resid 531.5802 Schwarz criterion 3.304811
Log likelihood -576.5065 F-statistic 328.5512
Durbin-Watson stat 2.024136 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Weighted Transport time performs better for some flows (Austria-Slovakia is a good
example) but distance is more appropriate for certain other flows.
The first conclusion is that distance may, after all, be a rather good indicator of trade
impediments. It captures more complex phenomena than it would seem at first glance.23
The second conclusion is that transport time is also a good indicator. One should note that
ony transport time was taken into account, not actual transport cost, so further
improvements are conceivable.
The second phase in using this data is to simulate EU membership by replacing transport
time with travel time, i.e. by taking away border waiting times, since this is the main effect
that EU membership would have on the transport of goods. This is done by estimating
flows using the model with transport times while replacing transport times with travel times.
Methodologically speaking, the underlying assumption is that the model’s parameters
would not change under these circumstances. Economically speaking, in the strict sense,
one assumes that a reduction in transport time would cause an increase in bilateral trade,
furthermore always with the same ratio in relative terms, since the gravity model’s
specification imposes constant partial elasticities. In a wider sense, however, one need not
view transport time itself as the sole cause for changes in trade levels. Rather, one can
view transport time also as a consequence of other events, such as EU membership: it
isn’t only due to a shortened transport time that two countries will trade more, but also
because of all the other economic, political and institutional improvements that common
EU membership would bring.  To simulate flows by reducing transport times in the model is
to proxy for an array of other changes that are not necessarily linked to transport issues.
Another aspect to bear in mind is that the model with transport time presents a larger
difference between the impact of the exporter’s Log(GDP) and the importer’s Log(GDP),
thus giving estimates that are further apart depending on the direction of the flow. This is
due to the fact that the reduced sample for the transport time model contains mainly large
countries with trade surpluses with their smaller partners, e.g. Germany, Italy and Russia
with most other countries of the sample, whereas the larger sample for the main model
also had countries such as the USA which generally import more from transition
economies than they export to them.
Below are tables displaying a small selection of flows alongside their estimates from the
transport time model. The full table is in the annex, together with the estimates from the
main model. As a first example, here are the estimated flows for Bulgaria with the EU3.







model with EU dummy
AT BG 88.166 64.020 155.737 91.8
BG AT 162.165 120.098 292.474 132.378
IT BG 565.091 169.079 358.659 242.107
BG IT 459.050 462.526 990.793 438.66
DE BG 524.731 232.451 466.203 364.454
BG DE 812.840 720.883 1469.294 713.869
The estimated potentials based on the disappearance of border waiting times are
substantially higher than those estimated with the classical model.24
Bulgaria’s geographical location means that total border waiting times are large so
removing them has a substantial impact on the estimated flow. Average aggregated
transport time between Bulgaria and Germany is 3574 minutes (59hrs 34min) of which
1580 minutes (26hrs 20 min) are border waiting time.
Flows between FR Yugoslavia and the EU3







model with EU dummy
AT YU 169.397 217.795 322.682 457.313
YU AT 113.856 409.262 569.097 604.528
DE YU 383.938 650.867 827.393 1135.075
YU DE 404.831 1930.649 2448.571 2038.118
IT YU 408.094 508.264 674.316 1276.403
YU IT 331.541 1318.215 1748.881 2120.003
In this case, estimated flows from the main model with the EU dummy are generally higher.
In part, this is due to the effect of the potential GDP used in the main model.
Regarding the estimates compared to the current flows, the model with transport times
doesn’t contain all the dummies present in the main model, thereby generating a much
higher base.
As for the general interpretation, it is much the same as when the main model was used:
there are large potentials if FR Yugoslavia integrates with the EU.
Flows between FR Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina







model with EU dummy




HR BA 115.900 41.855 50.099 65.622
HR YU 24.068 84.886 121.406 84.462
YU BA 187.785 29.226 48.067 111.296
YU HR 18.870 88.848 127.073 84.317
The interpretations are the same as with the main model: there is very strong overtrade
between Bosnia-Herzegovina and both Croatia and FR Yugoslavia, whereas trade flow
levels between Croatia and FR Yugoslavia are low but would increase dramatically in case
of common integration.
Conclusions
Gravity models contribute to the analysis of potential trade levels by giving a simple and
clear benchmark based on economic size and geographical distance. In two smaller25
sections, this paper experimented with alternatives to the usual GDP and distance. Both
attempts yielded interesting results, but neither of them clearly outperformed the more
classical set of variables. The classical gravity model can certainly be improved, but there
are too many country-pair specific factors for there to be an easy breakthrough.
The flows discussed in this paper are interesting in that many of them differ quite
significantly from what a gravity model would predict. On the one hand, this points to the
limited capacity of gravity models for forecasting of trade flow levels, but on the other hand,
some of these large deviations clearly constitute important information: some trade levels
in southeast Europe are unnaturally high or unnaturally low. This comes as no surprise
from a region that has experienced several military conflicts in recent years, but it also
means that, if one is to believe that reintegration is possible, the scope for change both in
levels and in the country-to-country distributions of these levels is very high.
For many purposes, it still makes sense to consider the region as three groups, one being
the former Yugoslavia, the second Albania and the third Romania and Bulgaria. Romania
and Bulgaria were not involved in any of the conflicts in the region. They each have an EU
association agreement, and they both trade at or above potential levels with the frontline
EU countries.
Albania is the least integrated country of the region, and it is doubtful whether it will ever
really be part of the region in an economic sense.
As for the countries of the former Yugoslavia, a combination of low GDP, high
unemployment and past (or present in the case of Macedonia) military conflicts has caused
trade levels to be highly distorted. Croatia and FR Yugoslavia trade little with each other,
but they both trade massively with their corresponding entity in Bosnia. Simultaneously,
they both have large future trade potentials with the EU.
In 1999, Macedonia traded at high levels with everyone in the region. Through its
agreement with Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand, and through still strong links with
Yugoslavia, it has acted almost as the region’s pivotal partner. Recent events,
unfortunately, may change this.
From a gravity model point of view, however, it is really FR Yugoslavia that should have
this role. FR Yugoslavia borders with all other six countries, has an access to the sea, and
has a border with Hungary, one of central Europe’s most successful economies and EU-
member-to-be.
Future political developments in the region could enable Yugoslavia to find its pivotal role
again. For example, FR Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are the only countries in26
Europe with which a TIR operation (road transport within the framework of the TIR system)
cannot be established. Changing this, together with WTO membership and some
agreement with the EU should help FR Yugoslavia re-integrate with its region. Also, many
people in western countries would like to see the countries of the region form some kind of
free-trade area. The agreement between Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia has shown that
this might be possible.
However there is a risk that the countries of the former Yugoslavia redirect massively to the
EU and end up being a set of small peripheral economies that are next to each other,
rather than integrated with one another. As was shown, the future potential levels of trade
between, say, Croatia and FR Yugoslavia are much smaller than the levels either of them
would have with Germany or Italy. This implies that regional integration would need to go
beyond just a free-trade zone to enable FR Yugoslavia to play its full part in the region.
For FR Yugoslavia to be pivotal, in other words, as some people put it, to be the region’s
Germany, it needs to have a much higher GDP, and it needs to be embedded in a strongly
integrated southeast Europe. For the moment, it only has the geographical location. This is
also a reason why the SEE-7 countries do not constitute a region today.27
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ANNEX29
Full Table of Flows and Potential Flows for 1999
This is the full table of (available) flows with and within southeast Europe. All flows are in millions of US dollars. Potential GDPs are used for the seven








GDPs and EA dummy
Estimate with Potential
GDPs and EU dummy




AL AT 16.21 29.535 37.350 66.338 73.820 103.708 59.738
AL BG 26.545 5.333 7.096 12.604 14.026 19.704 9.266
AL DE 50.454 166.556 210.630 374.104 416.298 584.847 310.177
AL GR 249.32 35.577 44.992 79.911 88.924 124.927 80.996
AL HR 8.396 4.246 6.617 11.753 13.079 18.374 12.893
AL HU 8.599 9.270 11.723 20.822 23.170 32.551 20.354
AL IT 341.454 177.349 224.279 398.346 443.275 622.746 254.786
AL MK 17.881 2.694 5.203 9.242 10.284 14.448 9.065
AL RO 6.202 7.153 9.187 16.317 18.157 25.509 14.471
AL SI 15.833 3.430 4.337 7.704 8.573 12.043 9.876
AL TR 49.161 27.300 34.524 61.318 68.234 95.861 48.423
AT AL 2.391 17.392 22.797 40.490 45.056 63.299 18.587
AT BA 30.9655 8.669 20.537 36.477 40.591 57.025 106.224
AT BG 88.17 44.141 46.447 82.495 91.800 128.967 155.737
AT HR 262.48 673.145 829.627 1473.517 1639.712 2303.591 698.362
AT MK 6.80 15.762 24.070 42.750 47.572 66.833 52.902
AT YU 169.397 151.158 231.382 410.962 457.313 642.468 322.682
BA AT 157.106 14.424 30.485 54.145 60.252 84.646 251.204
BA BG 9.343 4.059 9.027 16.034 17.842 25.066 20.531
BA DE 376.581 282.593 597.235 1060.760 1180.400 1658.316 1099.240
BA GR 14.515 20.247 42.790 76.000 84.572 118.813 105.960
BA HR 595.122 14.289 37.218 66.104 73.560 103.342 70.119
BA IT 323.504 279.155 589.969 1047.855 1166.040 1638.142 844.710
BA MK 21.307 1.691 5.456 9.691 10.784 15.150 8.187
BA RO 12.32 7.483 16.063 28.530 31.748 44.602 42.876
BA RU 15.843 10.258 21.678 38.503 42.846 60.193 51.148
BA SI 397.908 8.451 17.860 31.722 35.300 49.592 48.080
BG AL 0.033 4.559 6.246 11.093 12.345 17.343 5.417
BG AT 162.17 64.084 66.978 118.961 132.378 185.975 292.474
BG DE 812.84 345.582 361.189 641.514 713.869 1002.897 1469.294
BG GR 307.50 48.257 50.436 89.581 99.684 140.044 324.713
BG HR 2.26 18.206 23.452 41.653 46.351 65.118 52.259
BG HU 49.39 21.633 22.609 40.157 44.686 62.779 111.823








GDPs and EA dummy
Estimate with Potential
GDPs and EU dummy




BG MK 24.61 14.431 23.033 40.909 45.523 63.954 23.153
BG RO 71.66 32.794 34.811 61.829 68.803 96.659 142.163
BG RU 1124.26 28.309 29.588 52.551 58.478 82.155 117.410
BG SI 22.71 7.409 7.743 13.753 15.305 21.501 44.013
BG TR 164.78 82.595 86.326 153.325 170.618 239.697 432.226
BG UA 130.20 11.149 11.652 20.696 23.030 32.354 48.571
BG YU 176.946 19.394 31.028 55.109 61.325 86.154 84.577
DE AL 22.377 72.206 94.645 168.101 187.060 262.797 57.539
DE BA 104.556 125.027 296.212 526.109 585.447 822.481 277.233
DE BG 524.73 175.245 184.399 327.514 364.454 512.012 466.203
DE HR 685.41 790.700 974.510 1730.846 1926.064 2705.880 1467.986
DE MK 260.14 62.759 95.838 170.219 189.418 266.109 156.620
DE RO 1894.45 431.582 438.340 778.544 866.354 1217.119 1279.779
DE YU 383.938 375.181 574.302 1020.029 1135.075 1594.640 827.393
GR AL 38.0156 22.416 29.383 52.187 58.073 81.586 28.272
GR BA 3.4695 13.019 30.845 54.784 60.963 85.645 50.271
GR BG 348.79 35.566 37.424 66.469 73.966 103.913 194.092
GR HR 30.04 41.767 51.477 91.429 101.741 142.933 163.900
GR RO 208.10 58.575 59.492 105.666 117.584 165.190 273.782
GR YU 116.573 55.709 85.275 151.459 168.541 236.780 222.959
HR AL 0.38 3.404 5.348 9.499 10.570 14.850 6.762
HR AT 549.19 916.393 1098.584 1951.216 2171.289 3050.392 1178.439
HR BA 115.9 11.690 33.202 58.971 65.622 92.191 50.099
HR BG 8.48 17.072 21.535 38.249 42.564 59.796 46.875
HR DE 1439.47 1462.132 1752.823 3113.224 3464.356 4866.991 4152.681
HR GR 17.54 53.141 63.706 113.150 125.912 176.890 246.108
HR HU 174.50 104.240 124.964 221.951 246.984 346.982 351.940
HR IT 1234.24 1826.277 2189.366 3888.576 4327.158 6079.121 3536.920
HR MK 52.40 3.390 6.206 11.023 12.267 17.233 17.533
HR RO 12.79 20.618 25.104 44.587 49.616 69.704 101.872
HR RU 668.07 36.097 43.274 76.859 85.528 120.157 143.674
HR SI 616.10 127.743 153.139 271.994 302.671 425.216 314.387
HR TR 29.67 57.359 68.763 122.131 135.906 190.931 263.065
HR UA 25.00 11.377 13.638 24.224 26.956 37.869 49.923
HR YU 24.070 23.288 42.734 75.901 84.462 118.658 121.406
HU AL 0.131 6.624 8.682 15.420 17.160 24.107 8.788
HU BA 2.779 17.214 40.783 72.435 80.605 113.240 53.824
HU BG 33.36 18.080 19.024 33.789 37.600 52.824 82.571
HU HR 39.80 92.908 114.506 203.376 226.314 317.943 289.719








GDPs and EA dummy
Estimate with Potential
GDPs and EU dummy




HU RO 234.48 41.869 42.524 75.528 84.047 118.075 262.089
IT AL 168.798 83.118 108.949 193.506 215.331 302.513 53.926
IT BA 179.723 133.519 316.332 561.844 625.213 878.346 243.201
IT BG 565.09 116.416 122.496 217.568 242.107 340.131 358.659
IT HR 715.41 1067.696 1315.898 2337.193 2600.798 3653.799 1427.381
IT MK 168.87 63.422 96.851 172.019 191.421 268.922 127.827
IT RO 2064.46 249.849 253.761 450.710 501.544 704.607 831.498
IT YU 408.094 421.895 645.808 1147.032 1276.403 1793.187 674.316
MK AL 3.1554 2.730 5.166 9.176 10.211 14.345 7.062
MK AT 44.52 27.118 39.153 69.540 77.383 108.714 132.383
MK BA 8.8173 1.748 5.979 10.620 11.818 16.602 8.662
MK BG 91.32 17.102 25.982 46.147 51.351 72.142 30.851
MK DE 245.27 146.664 211.755 376.102 418.522 587.971 657.726
MK GR 163.97 32.666 47.163 83.768 93.216 130.956 236.801
MK HR 61.79 4.285 7.624 13.541 15.069 21.169 26.045
MK HU 20.02 9.891 14.281 25.364 28.225 39.652 50.092
MK IT 92.69 137.100 197.946 351.575 391.228 549.627 470.530
MK RO 9.08 10.231 15.002 26.646 29.651 41.656 38.424
MK RU 91.38 8.489 12.256 21.769 24.224 34.032 42.235
MK SI 156.67 2.851 4.116 7.311 8.136 11.430 20.407
MK TR 53.50 25.378 36.641 65.079 72.419 101.739 127.705
MK UA 114.79 3.155 4.555 8.090 9.003 12.648 16.229
MK YU 181.883 6.607 14.603 25.937 28.862 40.547 50.078
RO AT 303.50 135.242 137.077 243.466 270.926 380.617 661.390
RO BG 54.90 28.698 30.607 54.362 60.493 84.986 113.463
RO DE 1778.40 744.795 754.901 1340.794 1492.019 2096.101 3219.103
RO GR 198.50 69.551 70.495 125.208 139.330 195.741 365.723
RO HR 5.70 19.241 24.036 42.691 47.506 66.740 90.643
RO HU 412.00 43.840 44.435 78.921 87.823 123.380 283.284
RO IT 2039.60 398.836 404.248 717.993 798.974 1122.459 1833.279
RO MK 3.10 7.555 11.693 20.769 23.111 32.468 23.015
RO RU 702.30 86.679 87.855 156.042 173.641 243.945 265.421
RO SI 46.50 14.958 15.161 26.928 29.965 42.098 80.365
RO TR 236.80 153.577 155.661 276.472 307.655 432.217 493.499
RO UA 106.40 43.289 43.876 77.929 86.719 121.829 126.079
RU BA 5.0905 6.263 14.838 26.355 29.327 41.201 22.087
RU BG 109.00 19.812 20.847 37.026 41.202 57.884 64.221
RU HR 91.20 26.940 33.203 58.972 65.624 92.193 87.612
RU MK 18.18 5.013 7.655 13.597 15.130 21.256 17.337








GDPs and EA dummy
Estimate with Potential
GDPs and EU dummy




SI AL 1.8159 2.752 3.608 6.408 7.131 10.018 5.189
SI BA 54.2176 6.921 16.398 29.125 32.410 45.532 34.405
SI BG 50.06 6.955 7.318 12.998 14.464 20.320 39.551
SI HR 443.98 127.881 157.609 279.932 311.505 437.626 314.963
SI MK 36.63 2.258 3.449 6.126 6.816 9.576 13.762
SI RO 45.67 16.046 16.297 28.945 32.210 45.251 90.486
TR BG 295.57 57.801 60.820 108.023 120.207 168.876 236.399
TR RO 401.16 122.810 124.733 221.541 246.528 346.341 338.185
UA BG 67.46 9.887 10.403 18.477 20.561 28.886 39.634
UA HR 8.30 10.759 13.260 23.552 26.208 36.819 45.418
UA MK 1.56 2.361 3.605 6.403 7.125 10.010 9.939
UA RO 52.35 43.867 44.554 79.132 88.058 123.710 128.894
YU AT 113.856 211.409 305.867 543.256 604.528 849.287 569.097
YU BA 187.785 16.428 56.311 100.016 111.296 156.357 48.067
YU BG 151.595 18.684 28.443 50.519 56.217 78.977 79.405
YU DE 404.831 712.747 1031.205 1831.543 2038.118 2863.302 2448.571
YU GR 146.946 72.818 105.353 187.119 208.223 292.528 350.265
YU HR 18.870 23.925 42.661 75.771 84.317 118.454 127.073
YU HU 101.823 101.507 146.860 260.842 290.261 407.781 251.453
YU IT 331.541 741.383 1072.635 1905.128 2120.003 2978.341 1748.881
YU MK 122.425 5.371 11.867 21.077 23.455 32.951 35.284
YU RO 108.569 41.504 60.989 108.323 120.541 169.345 137.978
YU RU 274.294 36.278 52.488 93.224 103.739 145.740 127.977
YU SI 23.820 18.276 26.442 46.964 52.261 73.420 94.802
YU TR 59.708 69.366 100.359 178.250 198.355 278.664 328.794
Country codes are : AL=Albania, AT=Austria, BA=Bosnia-Herzegovina, BG=Bulgaria, DE=Germany, GR=Greece, HR=Croatia, HU=Hungary, IT=Italy, MK=Macedonia, RO=Romania,
RU=Russia, SI=Slovenia, TR=Turkey, UA=Ukraine, YU=FR Yugoslavia33
Cross-section estimation for 1999, SEE dummy variables not included
The estimated model below is the one used in the 'Future Prospects for Trade' section.
The underlying idea is to have a model which contains estimations for all distortion effects
except those that affect Southeast Europe.
Dependent Variable : Aggregate imports c.i.f. in millions of USD
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Dummy Effect
INTERCEPT 5.513635 0.271051 20.34172 0.0000
LOG(GDP of Importer) 0.865738 0.019488 44.42419 0.0000 *****
LOG(GDP of Exporter) 0.997911 0.019525 51.11029 0.0000 *****
LOG(DISTANCE) -1.275107 0.040463 -31.51256 0.0000 *****
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 0.912033 0.360666 2.528747 0.0116 2.49
Non-EU OECD 1.172918 0.254893 4.601617 0.0000 3.23
Non-EU OECD with EU 0.681494 0.118983 5.727637 0.0000 1.98
EU14 0.681299 0.107962 6.310561 0.0000 1.98
EU Association Agreements 0.574431 0.080628 7.124483 0.0000 1.78
CEFTA7 1.021248 0.175322 5.824981 0.0000 2.78
Visegrad-4 – CIS 1.567151 0.219726 7.132303 0.0000 4.79
CIS 3.251591 0.433814 7.495364 0.0000 25.83
BALTIC States 3.24397 0.437525 7.414361 0.0000 25.64
BALTIC States – CIS 2.270264 0.255149 8.897813 0.0000 9.68
Austria – Slovakia -1.903502 0.757331 -2.513435 0.0121 0.15
Czech Republic – Slovakia 1.878192 0.763623 2.459579 0.0140 6.54
R-squared 0.833755 Mean dependent var 5.109244
Adjusted R-squared 0.831817 S.D. dependent var 2.567727
S.E. of regression 1.053027 Akaike info criterion 2.953417
Sum squared resid 1427.109 Schwarz criterion 3.016931
Log likelihood -1908.151 F-statistic 430.3058
Durbin-Watson stat 1.585891 Prob(F-statistic) 0
The evolution of the SEE-7 effect
The clearest and least controversial way of showing the SEE-7 effect’s downturn is to
estimate the baseline gravity model (with only GDPs and distance) with only the SEE-7
dummy variable on cross-section data, separately for the years 1996 to 1999 and to look at
the evolution in the parameter estimate and its t-statistic.
Cross-section regression on 1996 data
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
INTERCEPT 6.021508 0.272907 22.0643 0.0000
LOG(GDP of importer) 0.905998 0.017287 52.40965 0.0000
LOG(GDP of exporter) 1.057857 0.017335 61.02359 0.0000
LOG(DISTANCE) -1.370067 0.040449 -33.87146 0.0000
SEE-7 Dummy 0.895068 0.2219 4.033657 0.0001
Cross-section regression on 1997 data
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.34
INTERCEPT 6.268236 0.269312 23.27499 0.0000
LOG(GDP of importer) 0.931933 0.017299 53.87294 0.0000
LOG(GDP of exporter) 1.060305 0.017363 61.06694 0.0000
LOG(DISTANCE) -1.406385 0.040086 -35.08377 0.0000
SEE-7 Dummy 0.786715 0.218989 3.592489 0.0003
Cross-section regression on 1998 data
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
INTERCEPT 6.262779 0.276976 22.61125 0.0000
LOG(GDP of importer) 0.916918 0.018119 50.6055 0.0000
LOG(GDP of exporter) 1.057186 0.018182 58.14331 0.0000
LOG(DISTANCE) -1.390566 0.041213 -33.7412 0.0000
SEE-7 Dummy 0.395531 0.225174 1.756562 0.0792
Cross-section regression on 1999 data
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
INTERCEPT 6.345941 0.276102 22.98403 0.0000
LOG(GDP of importer) 0.917771 0.01799 51.01579 0.0000
LOG(GDP of exporter) 1.04712 0.01806 57.98049 0.0000
LOG(DISTANCE) -1.39374 0.041274 -33.76804 0.0000
SEE-7 Dummy 0.376603 0.224154 1.680105 0.0932
The SEE-7 dummy variable loses its significance at the 5% level already in 1998, and is
even less significantly different from zero in 1999. There used to be an overall regional
effect, meaning a significant average positive distortion in favour of trade within the region
compared to trade between the other countries in the sample, but in 1998 and 1999, this
was no longer the case.
This result is more striking than it seems : even if the countries of the region had no
specific links with each other, they should display a significant positive distortion because
of the multiple common land borders they share.
Transport nodes and corresponding shares of national GDP
Country Transport Node Share in GDP Country Transport Node Share in GDP
DE Berlin 0.16 MK Skopje 0.50
DE Hamburg 0.07 MK Tetovo 0.20
DE Braunschweig 0.10 MK Bitola 0.30
DE Köln 0.17 GR Athens 0.50
DE Frankfurt 0.19 GR Ioannina 0.10
DE Stuttgart 0.14 GR Thessaloniki 0.20
DE Nürnberg 0.05 GR Larissa 0.10
DE Regensburg 0.03 GR Alexandroupoli 0.10
DE München 0.09 RO Cluj 0.12
AT Innsbruck 0.09 RO Oradea 0.05
AT Villach 0.05 RO Timisoara 0.08
AT Linz 0.16 RO Orsova 0.05
AT Wien 0.39 RO Craijova 0.04
AT St. Pölten 0.07 RO Giurgiu 0.02
AT Eisenstadt 0.02 RO Sibiu 0.07
AT Graz 0.12 RO Brasov 0.09
AT Salzburg 0.06 RO Bucharest 0.23
AT Bregenz 0.04 RO Cernavoda 0.0335
Country Transport Node Share in GDP Country Transport Node Share in GDP
CZ Praha 0.66 RO Constanta 0.04
CZ Brno 0.34 RO Galati 0.06
SK Bratislava 0.46 RO Lasi 0.12
SK Zilina 0.32 BG Vidin 0.07
SK Kosice 0.22 BG Sofia 0.41
HU Györ 0.08 BG Pleven 0.06
HU Budapest 0.40 BG Plovdiv 0.09
HU Szombahtely 0.05 BG Russe 0.08
HU Szekesfehervar 0.08 BG Stara Zagora 0.06
HU Debrecen 0.07 BG Varna 0.11
HU Pecs 0.05 BG Burgas 0.12
HU Dunaújvaros 0.04 UA Lvov 0.20
HU Miskolc 0.08 UA Kyiv 0.30
HU Szeged 0.10 UA Uzhorod 0.05
HU Nagykaniza 0.05 UA Odessa 0.15
SI Ljubljana 0.72 UA Dnepropetrovsk 0.30
SI Maribor 0.28 RU Moskva 0.80
HR Rijeka 0.06 RU Novorossijsk 0.20
HR Split 0.19 TR Istanbul 0.60
HR Zagreb 0.48 TR Izmir 0.40
HR Slavonski Brod 0.14 IT Roma 0.40
HR Osijek 0.13 IT Milano 0.40
BA Sarajevo 0.40 IT Venezia 0.20
BA Banja Luka 0.25 PL Warszawa 0.25
BA Tuzla 0.20 PL Krakow 0.15
BA Mostar 0.15 PL Katowice 0.15
YU Novisad 0.18 PL Wroclaw 0.15
YU Beograd 0.40 PL Poznan 0.15
YU Podgorica 0.08 PL Gdansk 0.15
YU Kraljevo 0.10 AL Tirana 0.75
YU Nis 0.10 AL Shkodra 0.25
YU Pristina 0.14 BY Minsk 1.00
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